Summer waves 18 x 52 pool


2009.04.21 07:30 kevin143 Kratom

Welcome to the kratom advocacy subreddit. Feel free to share helpful hints, tips, and news about kratom.

2015.11.08 15:18 FabianDR Need for Speed: No Limits Forum

Discuss the mobile racing game "Need for Speed: No Limits": Chapter progress, tips, cars, SE's and more. Available for iOS and Android. NFS No Limits is a mobile racing game with awesome graphics and customizable cars.

2018.06.09 05:01 justbrown522 Kratom Europe

Welcome to the European kratom advocacy subreddit. Feel free to share helpful hints, tips, and news about kratom.

2023.03.24 06:32 Thee_Randy_Lahey Saskatchewan Legislative Assembly, March 15, 2023

Debates (Contains verbatim):
Orders of the day:
Nothing particularly notable, just a bunch of politicians from across the country that they invited. See debates if you want details.
Betty Nippi-Albright (NDP) 1:42:00
Presents a petition signed by residents of Saskatoon that calls for duty-to-consult legislation to be enacted. The petitioners are concerned that without this legislation in place, the government is responsible for recognizing when the duty-to-consult is triggered, which has resulted in a lack of engagement with Indigenous communities and lost court battles. The petitioners request that the Legislative Assembly of Saskatchewan call on the Government of Saskatchewan to immediately stop the sale of Crown lands and enact meaningful duty-to-consult legislation. 90% of crown land has already been sold.
Terry Dennis (SaskParty) 1:43:17
The federal government is infringing on their rights. Wants the Sask First policies.
*NOTE: This is the daily unfounded constitutional challenge that they bring.
Vicki Mowatt (NDP) 1:44:28
Ms. Mowat presents a petition signed by residents of Wilkie that calls for the Government of Saskatchewan to fix the rural health care staffing crisis. The petitioners are concerned about the recruitment and retention of health care professionals in Saskatchewan's rural health care facilities, which has led to disruptions in emergency room, acute, lab, and X-ray services. The petitioners request that the Legislative Assembly of Saskatchewan call on the Government of Saskatchewan to address the staffing crisis.
Vicki Mowatt (NDP) 1:48:39
Bringing awareness to multiple myeloma.
Alana Ross (SaskParty) 1:46:59
Tribute to Himboldt Broncos and an intro to a local from her riding. He presented the team and and ems/first responders last year.
Nathaniel Teed (NDP) 1:48:26
Speaks about dedication and passion of the Ukrainian Museum of Canada and its staff, volunteers, and community members. He highlights the importance of the museum's artifacts and how they remain relevant today. Mr. Teed was invited to give remarks at the opening of a new exhibit at the museum, which remembers the discriminatory reality of Canada's detainment policies during World War I. He mentions that thousands of Ukrainians were among those held in internment camps across Canada and forced to work in a country they did not know. He also connects current events, such as Putin's unprovoked invasion of Ukraine.
Terry Jenson (SaskParty) 1:49:40
Talks about 5000 people in Warman joining for a cheerleading event.
Gary Grewal (SaskParty) 1:51:15
Talks about his visit to the Regina Trades and Skills last fall.
Fred Bradshaw (SaskParty) 1:52:47
Talks about some people joining the winter games this past winter.
Muhammad Fiaz (SaskParty) 1:54:01
Starts by saying “Members opposite won’t want to hear it, but we have good news from our economy”. He says that urban starts in Saskatchewan for Feb 2023 are up 76% from last year, and claims that the best in the country. He also says more people are choosing to move here because we are the most stable on the planet.
*NOTE: I didn’t bother fact checking this, but a year ago were pandemic measures, short supply of building materials etc. It’s a dishonest metric from the start. And to start out inflammatory… strange. His entire speech is ridiculous, especially when you consider our worst in country outmigration and migration retention rates.
Health Care Staffing and Provision of Emergency Care 1:55:30
Vicki Mowatt, Nathaniel Teed (NDP) vs Paul Merriman (SaskParty)
Mowat accuses the government of failing on the economy and health care, citing the closure of the emergency room at Regina General Hospital in Regina. She questions whether the people of Regina should expect such failures when it comes to their emergency care.
Merriman’s excuse is there are always ebbs and flows within the health care system and that officials have told him the pressure at the Regina General has been alleviated. He also cites that Saskatoon emergency was shut down over the weekend as well.
He also mentions that the government is working on a human resource plan to ensure that people in Saskatchewan receive the health care they deserve. Mowat argues that health care workers are sounding the alarm and that the disaster at the Regina General should never have happened, and quotes the president of the Saskatchewan Union of Nurses (SUN) as saying that there is not enough time, capability, or staff to provide safe patient care in most facilities in the province.
Mowat questions the Minister of Health's responsibility for the state of health care and demands that he take action to ensure that such incidents never happen again. The Minister responds by stating that he met with SUN and other stakeholders to discuss the government's four-point plan to address the issue. He also cites the government's efforts to hire more doctors and nurses and to expand the scope of health care providers in the system. Mowat insists that the government's HR plan is not enough and that it is not working. She criticises the government's 15-year record and accuses it of refusing to take responsibility for its failures.
She also questions why the Minister of Health is not listening to nurses and local voices in health care and demands that he work to find real solutions to the crisis in emergency rooms. She says that he shut down a request for a task force to address these issues. The Minister responds by stating that he meets with unions and other groups regularly to incorporate their ideas into the government's plan. He emphasises that the government is working to meet the needs of people in Saskatchewan and will never take their health care for granted.
Teed describes a retired nurse from his riding who had to lay on the floor having a medical emergency. She couldn’t get an ambulance and called family to say goodbye. Merriman responds by he has met with the ambulance providers and went for coffee with them. Teed fires back saying no one should wait an hour for an ambulance, and people are getting hurt.
\NOTE: The tomorrow measures Merriman cites have been deemed not enough by the provincial auditor. They use the same excuse week after week, but the results appears to get work, considering that ERs are closed in our largest cities. He mentions this 4 point plan, and cites the number of nurses and doctors that he’s bring in, but it’s all bandaids, and it’s fewer than we should have previously had. The plan is very late.*
Jennifer Bowes, Matt Love (NDP) vs Dustin Duncan (SaskParty)
Access to childcare spaces
Bowes expresses concern about the crisis in the healthcare system and the rushed announcement of a $10-a-day childcare policy, and didn’t take the time to get things right to get headlines. She argues that parents who rely on part-time care should not be collateral damage in the minister's desire to score a great headline. Bowes questions whether the Duncan will work with childcare workers to ensure that no one loses their space as a result of the announcement. Duncan responds by assuring that no spaces will be cut, and he emphasizes that he got this deal done 3 years early. Bowes continues to press for answers, stating that the government needs to listen to parents and childcare providers who stand to lose access to their spots. She argues that a one-size-fits-all approach does not work for working moms in Saskatoon and Whitewood. Duncan questions the opposition's inconsistent stance on the policy and its impact on the economy.
\NOTE Duncan’s comment about the NDP being inconsistent is nothing but absurd. He is still positioning this as his achievement, but reality is he accepted the $10 a day, he didn’t work for it at all. I also didn’t fact check school funding numbers.. It’s clearly underfunded regardless.*
Funding for education
Matt Love (NDP) vs Dustin Duncan (SaskParty)
Love chimes up that Prairie Valley School division has now started a charity to continue to keep their school running. Duncan insists that he has foundations in place to keep the schools going, and his side of the isle laughs out loud at Love, then he claims Saskatchewan is the highest spending on education in the country. Love returns back that he asked about this funding in 2020, and Duncan told him “We are not going to rely on bake sales to ensure that we have a continuation of a safe return to work” and asks how bottle drives compare as a funding method. Duncan again insists that they’re giving a lot of money to schools, and asks if Love doesn’t want people with a lot of money to help fund the schools, and cites the Brownlee family (may be spelled wrong, I don’t know who they are.)
Government Support for Harm Reduction 2:18:15
Vicki Mowatt (NDP) vs Everette Hindley (SaskParty)
Latest overdose numbers, 103 deaths in two months this year, same as all of 2016. This conversation happens daily. Hindley says that they have a going forward plan of additional funding. Mowatt continues to press for immediate action, Hindley justifies the money that has been spent but doesn’t address the current record, but has a going forward plan.
Bill No. 109 — The Trespass to Property Amendment Act, 2022 2:22:00
Nicole Sarauer (NDP)
Says that they have put very serious concerns on the record about the bill, how it would affect stakeholders. She brings up the premiers tweet about federal workers going on to private property and calls it a redundant bill since people already need to abide by these laws. Cites concerns from Saskel, SaskEnergy and highways workers who are concerns about the rhetoric and their safety.
Bill No. 116 — The Plant Health Act 2:25:06
Vicki Mowatt (NDP)
Notes importance of pest control in agriculture. She is leaving more questions to their critic.
Bill No. 117 — The Saskatchewan Firearms Act 2:27:45
Betty Nippi-Albright (NDP)
Cites her experience of her husband being shot by an illegal firearm, as well as being an indigenous person who relies on firearms for their way of life. She shares the concerns of FSIN regarding lack of consultation. She wants more consultation with impact communities.
Bill No. 118 — The Warrant Compliance Act 2:34:32
Vicki Mowatt (NDP)
She agrees with powers to the police to help find violent reoffenders. Again raises concerns about who is a repeat violent offender, there are definitions missing, and she is concerned about unintended consequence for families, especially kids.
Bill No. 122 — The Saskatchewan Revenue Agency Act 2:37:56
Doyle Vermette (NDP)
Asks why they are doing this, he’s been asking every reading but isn’t getting an answer. Says there was no consultation, and now business will need to file two taxes, one provincial one federal. No answers provided. He cites the cost of a new crown, and says that he has heard ministers in the Saskparty say that they can raise taxes, and they’ll still get voted in. And when the result is negative, they’ll say something about the liberal ndp federal government and put their hand out begging for federal dollars.
Bill No. 124 — The Alcohol and Gaming Regulation Amendment Act 2:45:38
Jennifer Bowes (NDP)
Cites once again there are mixed responses from stakeholders, and wants the government to consult.
Bill No. 126 — The Summary Offences Procedure Amendment Act, 2022 2:52:58
Nathanial Teed (NDP)
He’s happy about allowing first nations to enforce their own laws, bylaws, summar offense tickets, time limits. He’s in favour.

This will be archived on SaskPoli\**. I am open to linking missed or relevant factual information provided, as well as correcting inaccuracies.**\**
submitted by Thee_Randy_Lahey to SaskPoli [link] [comments]

2023.03.24 06:13 CakesEverywhere Are quad rolls allowed to be posted? If, in the case of a no, how's My Rosario looking?

Are quad rolls allowed to be posted? If, in the case of a no, how's My Rosario looking? submitted by CakesEverywhere to SWChronicles [link] [comments]

2023.03.24 05:58 JuniorApricot3303 #RECOVERY Out Now y'all make sure to stream and purchase. QRN went through way to much shit he hasn't even deserved these last couple years we gotta get him that #1 🤞🏽.... Best album so far this year and probably of his career let's do our part 💙💙 #3860

#RECOVERY Out Now y'all make sure to stream and purchase. QRN went through way to much shit he hasn't even deserved these last couple years we gotta get him that #1 🤞🏽.... Best album so far this year and probably of his career let's do our part 💙💙 #3860 submitted by JuniorApricot3303 to NBAYoungboy [link] [comments]

2023.03.24 05:57 Saber_Outrun Iron Stands Eternal.

Iron Stands Eternal. submitted by Saber_Outrun to MordekaiserMains [link] [comments]

2023.03.24 05:29 Street-Mouse-2776 first hatched shiny:)

first hatched shiny:) submitted by Street-Mouse-2776 to pokemongobrag [link] [comments]

2023.03.24 05:27 stult Why has Ukraine continued to defend Bakhmut despite reports of heavy losses?

I posted this long multi-comment thread on the megathread last Sunday, and several people suggested that I make it its own post, so here goes. Note this post is lightly edited from the original comment to improve readability and preserve some arguments made by another commenter in that thread without me having to do the hard work of editing the whole post to reflect their well-taken counterpoints. For those who read the original, it hasn't changed in any significant way except that one link. This post is largely my own analysis supported by links to a variety of credible sources.
Dr. Sovietlove; or How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Bakhmut
Many people on the daily megathread or on Twitter have been arguing that holding out in Bakhmut has caused enormous and unsustainable Ukrainian losses which will compromise their future offensive potential, and/or that Soviet-style leadership is the only reason the Ukrainians have held on to Bakhmut for so long. Much like during the Battle of Severodonetsk, I think a lot of people are overreacting to events in the Donbas and that the Ukrainians might have a perfectly reasonable strategic justification for continuing to defend Bakhmut. I have a few hypotheses about the situation and put together some analysis and sources to support those conclusions below.
My hypotheses in brief:
  1. Ukraine effectively has two armies, one post-Soviet and one NATO. UAF high commmand has recognized that they have to fight the Russians with an only partially modernized military which includes significant numbers of officers, soldiers, and equipment not suitable for NATO-style warfare. They recognize that you can't "beat a large Soviet army with a small one." They have therefore formulated a strategy to use the post-Soviet and NATO-style units where their particular strengths are most relevant, and are largely resourcing and employing them separately as a result.
  2. The UAF is aggressively applying economy of force principles, which dictate that an army should devote the maximum amount of resources to their primary effort, while allocating the smallest amount possible to any secondary efforts. Thus, the Ukrainians are committing the fewest possible resources to holding the line of contact in the Donbas while reserving as much as possible for their primary effort, which is the coming counteroffensive.
  3. Ukraine along with their allies and soft power proxies such as friendly journalists, whether knowingly or not, have been engaged in a disinformation campaign designed to lure Putin into committing the last of his mobilized reserves to an assault on Bakhmut in the last days of the mud season before the Ukrainian spring counteroffensive.
I'd like to emphasize that these are assessments backed by analysis and facts which you can check yourself below, but are definitely not by any means 100% certain.
Two Armies
The post-Soviet army can be characterized by its leadership, organization, and resources.
These units are generally not going to be as useful for offensives, but are certainly capable of holding a fortified defensive line, albeit likely at dreadfully high cost in some cases. Light infantry are surprisingly resilient to artillery fire when dug in properly, and so are an effective check against the (apparently declining) Russian artillery advantage. ATGMs and mines also make it possible for them to resist all but the most carefully coordinated combined arms assaults, which are a vanishingly rare occurence coming from the RuAF. And these units were relatively cheap to equip and quick to train. So they are well-suited for countering the three primary Russian numerical advantages in artillery, armor, and raw manpower, at least while fighting defensively in prepared positions.
On the other hand, their NATO-style forces are better suited for combined arms maneuver warfare and thus offensives. They emphasize distributed decision making, tactical flexibility, and robust communications between different units and levels of the command. That enables flexible coordination of multiple capabilities on the attack, such that defending against one capability makes defending against the others harder. e.g. suppressing entrenched infantry with artillery while mechanized units traverse open killing ground during an assault in order to bring their tank and IFV guns to bear on those infantry to suppress them after the artillery lets up. Ukraine is in the process of building out or deploying around 20-28 new brigades of this type. I feel a little bad sourcing to a comment from this megathread rather than a credible third-party source, but offogredux puts together truly excellent summaries of the current structure of Ukrainian forces, so why reinvent the wheel? Plus their information matches what I've seen elsewhere, including the less consolidated information available here on militaryland. Notably, some units are being built around smaller veteran battalion- or regiment-sized separate units that are upsized to brigades, while others are entirely new formations, but likely include substantial numbers of veteran leaders at all levels.
Ok, so where is this "NATO" army?
There are reports of extreme deficits of NATO-trained personnel at the front, which are typically presented as a sign of Ukrainian weakness (n.b., see below for more on why to treat any Ukrainian-sourced reports of Ukrainian weakness with a healthy dose of skepticism). Often sources attribute the deficit to high casualty rates among those personnel during the earlier stages of the war. Best estimates are that the Ukrainians have lost around 120k soldiers. They started the war with around 250k personnel, of whom perhaps 20k were US-trained veterans.
Since then, the UK, EU, and US have trained something like an additional 20k+ soldiers (possibly with some overlap with the other 20k, but likely insignificant numbers if so), with plans to expand training for tens of thousands of additional troops over the next year. So even if every single one of the pre-war NATO-trained personnel are casualties, the total number of NATO-trained personnel in the UAF has at worst remained constant, at best it has doubled, and in any case it will only continue to grow as the western training programs ramp up and the Ukrainians disseminate those skills by assigning NATO-trained personnel to their own training centers. (Note: when I first posted this, VigorousElk made an excellent counter-argument to this point here which is worth considering and I didn't want to cut out of the conversation by moving this to a text post. I don't think it undermines the overall thrust of the argument, though.)
However, the overall proportion of NATO-trained personnel in the UAF has almost certainly declined because mobilization has likely increased the total size of their forces by more than a factor of two, so the overall proprtion declined even if the total number of NATO-trained soldiers actually did double (which is very, very doubtful and the 40k number should be treated as an extremely loose upper bound). That proportion is probably even lower on the front lines if the UAF have allocated those soldiers to new unit formation and units held in reserve for the upcoming offensive. So even if the Ukrainians haven't experienced particularly high casualty rates among such soldiers, we should expect to see far fewer of them on the lines right now. Meaning we can't infer the execess casualty rate from the composition of front line units, as many commentators have, nor do we need a particularly high casualty rate to explain why there are so few of them at the front. Just the formation of so many new brigades must have sucked up all of the available experienced junior officers and NCOs, especially if the UAF are trying to concentrate NATO-trained personnel into specific units. Again that doesn't mean they haven't experienced high casualties, just that the issue probably isn't as bad as some of these articles have made out.
I suspect some of the authors of these articles have taken that position because of selection bias, e.g., Franz-Stefan Gad, who visited the front near Bakhmut with Michael Kofman recently. If you are only visiting the units that are intentionally being staffed with fewer NATO-trained personnel, you shouldn't be surprised to see fewer NATO-trained personnel. Their absence doesn't indicate permanent backsliding across the entire UAF, demonstrate the incompetence of the Ukrainians, nor prove that the Ukrainians have suffered anything near 100% casualties among their NATO-trained NCOs. Instead, it just reflects the relative prioritization of scarce resources by UAF command. In a recent War on the Rocks podcast episode, Kofman specifically pointed out that his visit (and by extension his companions' visits) did not involve any kind of general or systematic survey of the Ukrainian forces, and so any conclusions based on his observations should not be taken to be totally representative of what is happening across the entire UAF right now.
Cool. Where are the "Soviet" units then?
It helps to put yourself in Zaluzhny's shoes here. You have two big chunks of your armed forces that operate in very different ways and which are suitable for very different tasks. You are finding it difficult to encourage the newly mobilized senior officers to let go of their Soviet habits, but you also need them because there is no one else who is immediately prepared to lead newly mobilized formations. So you make the obvious, logical decision to use the Soviet-style mobilized commanders how and where you can best make use of them, while hopefully keeping their habits contained and isolated from your more professional units. The best place for those commanders in this war is probably on the defensive in the trenches, where rapid decision-making around complex maneuvers is less often necessary, light infantry can be effective at attriting enemy armored and maneuver forces, individual soldiers don't need as much training to be effective, combined arms operations are less frequent and more easily choreographed, the risk of catastrophic failure is less, and logistics are dramatically simpler than for an offensive force on the move with many vehicles requiring ammo, fuel, and maintenance.
The allocation of armored assets supports this conclusion. Per Oryx, Ukraine has received almost exactly the same number of Soviet-derived tanks from their western partners as they have lost so far in this war (488+ donated Soviet-variant tanks versus around 477 lost). Plus captured Russian equipment, they almost certainly have more armor available now than they did at the beginning of the war, not even taking into account the impending introduction of western tanks. Yet there are reports from the front lines that armor is relatively scarce and lightly used. It seems the UAF have combined multiple brigades into ad hoc corps or divisions along stretches of the line of contact (what Jomini calls a "defensive grouping") to fill in the gap left by the absence of real formations above brigade size in the Ukrainian ground forces TOE.
That grouping often consists of several lighter brigades holding the front line backed by a smaller number of more professionalized and/or heavily armored mech or armor brigades as the reserve. e.g., the UAF defensive grouping around Bakhmut in February, which consisted of two mech brigades backing two TDF brigades, one airmobile brigade, and one marine brigade, all equipped exclusively with Soviet-derived armor and IFVs, along with limited quantities of older western IMVs and APCs like the M113. So light infantry in the trenches, with armor in the rear to plug holes or provide indirect fire support. This approach allows the UAF to allocate the fewest number of regular mechanized and armored army units to the front, freeing up capacity for re-equiping and training for an offensive. It also puts the least amount of strain on their tank and IFV supplies, by making heaviest use of their soon-to-be legacy vehicles, which are also conveniently the ones more Soviet-minded commanders are most familiar with. Hence the relative dearth of armor at the front, even though we should expect more tanks and IFVs than were available at the beginning of the war. The reduced armor commitment comes at the expense of the light infantry in the trenches, who absorb Russian attacks without the benefit of enough tank or IFV support. Further evidence for the idea that lighter forces reliant more on IMVs/APCs form the bulk of forces around Bakhmut includes the UAF charging Russian lines riding M113s in the vicinty of Bakhmut literally yesterday. Which feels a bit like the modern equivalent to the apocryphal story about Polish cavalry charging tanks during WW2, but I guess they have to make do with the tools available.
Does the presence of Soviet-influenced commanders at the front indicate that the decision to hold Bakhmut was made by such officers blindly applying Soviet doctrine? I would argue probably not. Syrsky and Zaluzhny have long-established reputations as very much not that sort of officer, and both have reviewed and approved the decision to hold in Bakhmut. More importantly, and without relying on an appeal to their authority, there are sufficient strategic and operational justifications to continue the defense there, even if it is on less favorable terms than other defensive efforts across the front. Specifically, attriting Russian reserves to reduce their resistance to an offensive, much like what happened in Kharkiv last August.
If attriting Russian reserves is the goal, how can these conscript-heavy formations with Soviet-style leadership best do so?
Right now, Russia only has a single division held in reserve. That would be the 2nd Motorized Rifle Division, elements of which have likely been committed to combat already. This reserve exists to exploit any breakthroughs achieved by assaults on the Ukrainian defenses and to plug any holes in the Russian lines resulting from UAF attacks. If the reserve is depleted before the Ukrainian counter-offensive, the UAF will be able to achieve much more progress much more quickly. Once they breach the Russian lines, there is nothing to stop a penetration into operational depths. Even though the Russians have fortified extensive fallback positions on secondary lines throughout occupied Ukraine, they need reserves to hold those lines if the front lines are penetrated and the Russian units there are unable to withdraw to secondary positions in good order. Withdrawal under fire is a challenging task and one for which only the VDV has demonstrated any capacity on the Russian side. There is also no new wave of Russian mobilization yet to provide any further reserves any time in the near future. Thus, the more Russian reserves the UAF can burn through now, the better their chances on the offensive will be.
There's been a lot of talk about the loss ratio between the belligerents and how that ratio makes a retreat from Bakhmut likely necessary, but ultimately the loss ratio matters less than absolute numbers of Russian reserves attrited. Because the Russians are nearly out of reserves, a UAF attrition strategy may tip them into a full-on rout. If the Ukrainian leaders knew objectively they needed to inflict 1000 more casualties on the Russians to achieve victory, it would be worth losing many times as many Ukrainian soldiers to inflict those casualties. Achieving victory is often worth accepting unfavorable loss ratios, otherwise no one would ever go on the offensive. In any case, the friendly-to-enemy casualty ratios are still almost certainly in Ukraine's favor simply because they are defending, and there have been no serious reports at all that suggest any departure from that norm. So we aren't even talking about the Ukrainians suffering an unfavorable loss ratio at all, just a slightly less favorable one when compared to real ratios from different areas of the front or when compared to hypothesized loss ratios at proposed fallback defensive positions. Rob Lee and DefMon thus both make variations of the same error. They failed to compare the loss ratios around Bakhmut to the expected loss ratios for the offensive, because ultimately the Ukrainians face a choice between attriting the Russian reserves around Bakhmut now, or when they are on the offensive.
Why don't the Ukrainians retreat and get an even more favorable ratio in a better position?
First, because the Russian offensive will culminate in Bakhmut (or it already has) and the RuAF will likely enter an operational pause because of depleted offensive power. That pause will likely last longer than the Ukrainians plan to wait for their counterattack. Basically, only the possibility of victory in Bakhmut can induce the Russians to continue wasting their soldiers lives so recklessly before the spring. Second, because the current loss ratios are pretty well understood and relatively predictable, which is not necessarily true if they retreat. Retreating under fire is challenging even for elite units, and results are naturally unpredictable. Assessing the hypothetical defensibility of any fallback positions is also challenging, especially with sufficient accuracy to be able to meaningfully predict what kind of loss ratio improvements you might gain from repositioning. Third--and this reason is entirely hypothetical--it is possible that the Ukrainians have sufficient intelligence about Russian reserves to know exactly how long they need to hold out, and so perceive the hopefully quite proximate end to a battle that appears to us as outsiders as a limitless meatgrinder that will continue to waste Ukrainian lives indefinitely into the far future. Essentially, they know the price they are paying and what they are getting for it more precisely than we do.
In contrast, on the offensive, the UAF will likely experience a loss ratio that favors the Russians, even if the offensive is generally successful. The exchange in Bakhmut will be particularly favorable if they are able to trade less well-trained conscript formations for the few remaining high quality Russian formations such as Wagner's assault units and the remnants of the VDV. Notably the VDV played a critical role in holding the line in Kherson and delaying the UAF's offensive there until the successful Russian withdrawal across the Dnipro, and it seems reasonable that the Ukrainians don't want to see a repeat delay that may buy time for subsequent waves of Russian force generation. Bottom line, the Ukrainians need to fight these Russian reserves no matter what, and it will nearly always be more favorable to fight them on the defensive than offensive. The challenge with fighting them on the defensive is that the Russians need to agree to go on the offensive first, which means the Ukrainians need to fool the Russians into thinking an attack benefits their strategic objectives. Blessedly, the "we are lucky they are so fucking stupid" guy continues to be the reigning champ of summarizing this war in a single laconic sentence and the Russians have been willing to oblige the Ukrainians with attacks all throughout the mud season.
But by "fool the Russians", I really mean fool Putin. He is micromanaging the war, even dictating decisions at the level of colonels or brigadiers such as when to commit reserves, and that likely includes the much more momentous decision to commit the very last of their available combat reserves. He has repeatedly pushed the RuAF to make objectively poor military decisions for political purposes, and he does not receive reliable information, because he has reduced his circle of confidants to only a couple of advisors who largely tell him what he wants to hear and he does little to gather his own independent information.
Putin is also a classic bully in the distinctive style of the KGB, as Yale professor of history Timothy Snyder describes in an interview here. Their method is always to look for an opponent's weaknesses, and then to ruthlessly expand and exploit those weaknesses. Probably worth mentioning that Timothy Snyder has met with and advised Zelensky directly, so his views aren't just an academic theory, they reflect and influence the views of the actual Ukrainian decisionmakers. Those decisionmakers clearly understand that Putin's instinct is to attack weakness with maximum force, and therefore carefully shape perceptions of Ukrainian weakness to mislead Putin into attacking the wrong targets. I mean, it's pretty widely accepted that the Ukrainains signal weakness intentionally when trying to attract western support, so why should it be surprising that they apply the same techniques to deceiving Putin?
And that is also another reason why the Ukrainians can't just throw their best troops into the battle. If there were no weakness around Bakhmut, the Russians would simply stop attacking with those critically valuable remaining high quality VDV formations.
What weaknesses should the Ukrainians use to mislead Putin?
Putin is not an idiot, so the UAF can't simply invent weaknesses out of thin air. Instead, they have to find ways to exaggerate some real weaknesses while downplaying others. In this case, I think they are combining their very real Soviet-hangover leadership weakness with their related difficulties around conscription to lure the Russians into attacking Bakhmut under unfavorable conditions. Specifically, I am referring to the stories around conscription problems which imply manpower deficits across the board for the UAF and stories suggesting the defense of Bakhmut will compromise future UAF counteroffensives. Playing up those particular weaknesses presents an ideal picture to appeal to Putin's prejudices and his desperation for a politically palatable conclusion to the hostilities. If you blame Soviet-style leadership, it makes the Ukrainians look dumb and incompetent for not retreating, and suggests they remain saddled by the same legacy that has so limited Russian military capabilities during this war, which plays to Putin's belief in Russian superiority. It also suggests to Putin that not only can he achieve the minimally viable political victory he so desperately needs by taking Bakhmut, he can also compromise the Ukrainian ability to conduct future counteroffensives with the very same blow, opening the way for a negotiated settlement that freezes the current lines (plus/minus changes around Bakhmut). It's really the best remaining even theoretically conceivable outcome for Putin, and many of the recent stories and leaks from Ukrainian-aligned media seem perfectly crafted to suggest continuing to attack Bakhmut could very well achieve that outcome. Suspiciously perfect, I would argue.
There have been few reports of widespread difficulty around draft dodging in Ukraine until quite recently, well into the battle for Bakhmut, when suddenly a flood of stories appeared in the media about people avoiding conscription and Ukrainian officials aggressively conscripting people against their will, e.g. from the Economist and Newsweek. Which struck me as odd, considering that the Ukrainians have more than a million reservists and earlier in the war had far more volunteers than capacity to train them for at least the first six months of the war. Even as recently as December, Zaluzhny said that the UAF does not have manpower issues so much as a need for armor and munitions. So where are the volunteers, why are the units around Bakhmut being reinforced with untrained conscripts, and why all the news stories about aggressive conscription? My hypothesis is that the volunteers are funneled into the more NATO-style units, most of which are currently in reserve or training behind the lines, while the Soviet-influenced commanders are given conscripts (at least as a preference if not as a hard rule) and are burning through them faster than other units, mostly in the Donbas meat grinders around Avdiivka and Bakhmut. The prioritization of allocating volunteers to the more NATO-oriented units makes a lot of sense in that context. Mission command requires motivation and self-direction, which you are more likely to find in volunteers. Conscripts can perform at wildly varying levels, and generally can't be relied on as much to take initiative, and so are a better fit for the top-down Soviet command style. This preference or bias could also come about naturally because of self-sorting, as more Soviet-style commanders may be more willing to take on reluctant conscripts than more NATO-oriented leaders, and older officers steeped in Soviet doctrine will have more relevant experience for leading formations with older Soviet kit.
If that's how recruits are being allocated, it explains some of the resistance to conscription, because conscripts are disproportionately funneled straight into the meat grinder by default. For example, the story that has made the rounds of a soldier who received only five days of training before being deployed to Bakhmut. That soldier's experience doesn't mean the regular army volunteer units are having difficulty filling out their TOE or training their soldiers, just that some of the units most reliant on conscripts are. Notably his formation was the 101st Brigade for the Protection of the General Staff, which may be just about the most irregular unit in the entire UAF command structure, outside whatever chaos-demon worship seems to be happening over in the Ministry of Interior. The 101st is actually directly part of the General Staff, rather than assigned to an operational command, unlike every single other combat unit in the regular army.
So I don't know that his experience can be considered particularly representative, although it very well might be for conscripts with the bad luck of ending up in a Soviet-style unit that also happens to be committed to intense combat operations. But that's not all the units by a long shot. It's likely that for every soldier like that around Bakhmut, there are multiple comparable conscripts assigned to relatively quiet or less intense AOs where they are given the opportunity to learn some basic military skills on the job from the more senior members of their unit. So this would actually be a good way to increase their training pipeline, if somehow they could both predict where attacks would come with 100% certainty to avoid allocating untrained conscripts there and yet still somehow need to maintain high force density throughout the front, which seem like mutually contradictory propositions. It's a morally questionable but potentially effective technique for growing the training pipeline if they allocate excess untrained conscripts evenly across the front without regard to the risk that they will be thrown into combat unprepared, which this story seems to suggest may be their practice. It would also be an excellent way to make use of excess conscripts who were recruited primarily to mislead Russia about the level of manpower issues the UAF are experiencing, too.
This strategy of allocating resources across units suggests losses around Bakhmut won't compromise any offensive, because the offensive units are drawing on entirely different recruitment streams, training resources, and equipment types than the defensive units are. The conscript-heavy formations on the frontline at this very moment are serving to absorb Russian attacks and burn through Russian reserves while the more professional units prepare for an offensive that has the potential to be decisive. If it seems unfair to give worse equipment to the people doing the harder fighting right now, just remember economy of force. Bakhmut is secondary to the offensive. In the longer term, the recruitment challenges won't matter as much once the current Russian reserves are exhausted because the meat grinder will be over, and the UAF will no longer need to feed it. By the time Russia can generate any further forces for their own offensives, the Ukrainians will be over the hump in terms of adopting western tanks, IFVs, and combined arms doctrine and will have slack to retrain the units currently holding the lines to meet the same standards.
But what about the spring offensive?
The only contrary evidence to that assessment are reports, usually sourced from anonymous US or NATO defense officials, that western officials are telling the UAF that defending Bakhmut may compromise their ability to conduct a spring counteroffensive. Which really makes no sense at all to me, based on what formations and equipment types are allocated to Bakhmut. The reports are anonymous and lack any supporting detail beyond the basic claim. As I described above, the units around Bakhmut aren't the kinds of units the Ukrainians are likely to use on an offensive in the near future. I therefore tend to dismiss those anonymous reports as leaks intended to spread disinformation, and in particular to invite the Russians to feel confident in committing their reserves to an attack on Bakhmut.
The Russians (and more to the point Putin) may conclude that it's worth burning through their reserves if doing so compromises the Ukrainian ability to counterattack, and these leaks seem suspiciously well designed to invite that conclusion. If the leaked reports about compromising the offensive were true, they probably would not have been leaked at all, because they reveal an actual Ukrainian weakness in a manner which does nothing to protect that weakness. Contrast that scenario to leaks about the dire need for more long range artillery from about a year ago. Russia could absolutely figure out that the Ukrainians needed better long range fires on its own, so the leaks didn't risk revealing new information, yet did actively invite a solution in the form of western donations. Whereas the leak about Bakhmut (if true) just airs Ukrainian dirty laundry, with no real hope of changing the Ukrainian decision or bringing in additional western support. Meaning, it would be a disloyal leak, of which we have not seen many if any from the US/NATO side during this war (potentially not including the general jockeying between the allies for position around major weapons contributions like tanks). Basically the leak was like saying, "Oh no, Putin, whatever you do please don't attack Bakhmut, anywhere but there!" Something tells me the Ukrainians aren't inclined to give Putin good advice about how to hurt them.
Playing the conscription issues up in the media only serves to draw Russian attention to that weakness, too. So why are the Ukrainians permitting these stories to leak, or at least not taking any measures to limit their impact on the information space? One such story was about a man with no hands being denied an exemption from conscription, despite having been classified officially as permanently disabled for his entire life. It is an insane and ridiculous story of bureaucratic incompetence, which if true I would have expected the Ukrainians to suppress during war time because it makes them look so incompetent (again, note how the whiff of corruption and incompetence appeals to Putin's preconceived notions about Ukrainians) and because it was limited enough in scope that it could have been kept away from western reporters (unlike something as pervasive as widespread resistance to conscription). Instead the story was almost actively promoted by UAF-friendly sources like the Economist, which I believe broke the story originally. The Economist is quite explicitly pro-Ukrainian and is also cozy enough with the Ukrainian leadership to have gotten exclusive in-depth interviews with Zelensky, Zaluzhny, Budanov, Syrsky, and others, some of which I even linked as sources above. So it is out of character for them to publish such a lurid anecdote of Ukrainian incompetence.
On the other hand, if the Ukrainians wanted to convince the Russians that they are having manpower issues, one of the easiest ways to do so would be to send out their recruiters and encourage them to employ excessive aggression. Then to leak, plant, falsify, or simply permit publication of stories about the absurd lengths those officials are going to conscript new troops. The Russians would then pick up on the stories and possibly inaccurately infer manpower deficits. Even if the Russian intelligence agencies interpret the stories differently, Putin is more likely to disregard them and rely on media reports than he would have been in past years, before the FSB's incredibly inaccurate pre-war assessments of Ukraine contributed to his decision to invade. It would not surprise me at all to learn that Putin regularly reviews Russia-related press clippings from the Economist to understand how critical issues are being presented in the western media, even if only as part of a larger security or political briefing packet. In fact it would surprise me if he doesn't review at least a sampling of stories from western media, likely heavily biased toward traditional print media with wide influence like the Economist. Which makes it a viable channel for shaping Putin's perceptions, and the man without hands seems like the perfect attention grabbing detail to make sure he sees that particular story.
So basically, propaganda cuts both ways. We are operating in an information space that is quite intentionally shaped by Ukraine, and so should be careful in our conclusions about what is happening beneath the fog of war. Although, I would suggest that it's probably a good starting assumption that the Ukrainian leaders have not become suddenly much less intelligent or less capable than they have been over the last year of this war. Which isn't to say they are perfect, or that we won't see them lose their edge over time. Just that a sudden, rapid, simultaneous decline in Zaluzhny's, Zelensky's, Syrsky's, Budanov's, and the rest of the Ukrainian leadership's intelligence, judgment, and ability would be extremely unlikely. Especially if that decline persisted for a long time, as the decision to hold Bakhmut has, with ample opportunity for correction based on the widespread alarm about UAF losses.
submitted by stult to CredibleDefense [link] [comments]

2023.03.24 04:54 Lobukia That release of tension when you sell off the exploration data

That release of tension when you sell off the exploration data
Quite a few of the systems near the 1 mil mark by themselves... surprised, I don't get many of those... does first footfall boost that or something?
submitted by Lobukia to eliteexplorers [link] [comments]

2023.03.24 04:53 moonchick8899 Resources to teach 18 month-old water safety

We’ll be staying at my in-laws home this summer with a pool. We’ll take standard precautions (gated pool, constant supervision) but I’m still nervous about my now 18 month-old being completely unable to swim.
I looked into ISR swim lessons to teach him to float on his back if he falls in, but those classes are so expensive and no one teaches near me.
I have a local community pool I can use now, and I have about 12 weeks before we leave. Any ideas about how to teach him some water safety skills on my own? Ideally, I’d love to teach him to get on his back and breathe, but I haven’t found any comprehensive resources. I really need things explained step by step.
I also have a 4 year old who can’t swim yet, but we’re starting her in swim lessons in a couple weeks. Also open to ideas to help her along! Thanks!!
submitted by moonchick8899 to Parenting [link] [comments]

2023.03.24 04:38 ClipIn 2024 GMC Sierra 2500 & 3500 Heavy Duty: Everything I know

This post is specific to the 2024 GMC Sierra model year's 2500HD and 3500HD aka Heavy Duty versions. I'll include info on all trims. If you're looking for 1500 series models, some discounts below might be interestingvbut fair warning: most everything else is about the HD series trucks.
I've been watching all the news, spy shots, auto shows, press releases and can't wait to see this truck in person. Until then, I've been researching like crazy. Because I'm a nerd. Figured some other people might be like me, looking for all the quality updates, videos, pics, and (eventuallyI can't wait) reviews - so why not put them all in one place. Here goes...

Official stuff

  1. Go here >>
  2. Start a Chat session
  3. Provide your order number >> rep will tell you the status


Engine Denali Ultimate Denali AT4 SLT SLE Pro
MSRP 6.6L V8 Gas w/ 4WD (starting at) n/a $75,095 $70,995 $65,195 $57,795 $52,795
MSRP 6.6L V8 Turbo-Diesel w/ 4WD (starting at) $93,795 $84,585 $80,485 $74,685 $68,280 $63,780



I mean, it's about the best info we've got from the bigger websites


Official GM private event/unveiling, hands-on w/ senior GM design team
At various auto shows



Other conversations w/ recent intel on 2024 Sierra 2500HD's

Latest info I've heard

If I missed anything, please share! Just really like this truck, ordered one, can't wait for arrival. I am not in the car business, affiliated with any sites. Linked only to legit, high-quality sources that were best I could find, avoided the dumb Chinese bot knockoff YouTube channels and blogspam that just steal content. If you find some new juicy tidbits, please reply so we can all benefit.
submitted by ClipIn to gmcsierra [link] [comments]

2023.03.24 04:31 TongdaxinFormulas 中午

中午 submitted by TongdaxinFormulas to ChinaStockFormulas [link] [comments]

2023.03.24 04:21 SweetestAlisaa Looking for any commentary to help me to explore my chart .Difficult period of life thanks 🙌

Looking for any commentary to help me to explore my chart .Difficult period of life thanks 🙌 submitted by SweetestAlisaa to beginnerastrology [link] [comments]

2023.03.24 04:15 PuzzleheadedDig5670 Oregon recreational dispensary can't wait for the one's in 631 to open

Oregon recreational dispensary can't wait for the one's in 631 to open submitted by PuzzleheadedDig5670 to longislandents [link] [comments]

2023.03.24 03:43 SweetestAlisaa Hello Lovely people need advice by planet placements can find the right direction in life ? Thanks 🙌

Hello Lovely people need advice by planet placements can find the right direction in life ? Thanks 🙌 submitted by SweetestAlisaa to AskAstrologers [link] [comments]

2023.03.24 03:36 PuppyLover77 Win a Bestway Steel Pro MAX 18 Foot x 48 Inch Round Metal Frame Above Ground Outdoor Swimming Pool {US} (03/27/2023)

Win a Bestway Steel Pro MAX 18 Foot x 48 Inch Round Metal Frame Above Ground Outdoor Swimming Pool {US} (03/27/2023) submitted by PuppyLover77 to giveaways [link] [comments]

2023.03.24 03:22 NotSoSasquatchy [MINI] TIE Bomber - 92 spots @ $1 ea.

[MINI] TIE Bomber 75347
Lego Price: $69 w/ tax
Shipping: $23: 18020 (PA) to 91932 (Furthest zone). 16 x 12 x 3 , 4 lbs. Ships via USPS Ground, insured to full value.
Raffle Total/Spots: $92 = 92 spots @ $1 ea.
Price justification:
Call spots: Y
Spot limit per person: N
Duration of spot limit: N/A
Location(Country): USA
Will ship international: No – HI and AK pay add’l costs
Timestamp pics:
Description: Great condition
Payment required w/in 20 minutes of raffle filling

PayPal Info: [REDACTED]
Cash App Info: [REDACTED]

Tip BlobAndHisBoy
Number of vacant slots: 0
Number of unpaid users: 0
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This slot list is created and updated by The EDC Raffle Tool by BlobAndHisBoy.
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submitted by NotSoSasquatchy to lego_raffles [link] [comments]

2023.03.24 02:39 Fridaysgame WGC Match Play Friday Scenarios to Advance to Round of 16

I've done a quick write up of the scenarios for each player to advance out of the group stage and into the Round of 16. It is sorted by group, but of course just ctrl +f if you're looking for a specific player.
When a player has multiple ways to advance, they are listed with (a), (b), (c), etc.

Group 1
S. Scheffler (1) - (a) Win, (b) Draw, (c) lose match then win sudden death against Kim, and possibly Riley if he wins
T. Kim (17) - Win, then win sudden death against Scheffler and possibly Riley if he wins
A. Noren (38) - Cannot Advance
D. Riley (54) - Win and have Kim beat Scheffler, then win 3-way sudden death with Scheffler and Kim.

Group 2
J. Rahm (2) - (a) Win and have Fowler lose or tie, (b) Win and have Fowler win, then win sudden death against Fowler
B. Horschel (22) - (a) Win, (b) Draw and have Fowler win, then win sudden death against Fowler
K. Mitchell (39) - Cannot Advance
R. Fowler (49) - (a) Win and have Rahm/Horschel tie, then win against Horschel in sudden death, (b) Win and have Rahm win, then win against Rahm in sudden death

Group 3
R. McIlroy (3) - (a) Win, (b) Draw
K. Bradley (20) - Win
D. McCarthy (48) - Cannot Advance
S. Stallings (52) - Cannot Advance

Group 4
P. Cantlay (4) - (a) Win, (b) Tie, then win against Harman in sudden death
B. Harman (25) - (a) Win, (b) Tie, then win against Cantlay in sudden death
K. Lee (35) - Cannot Advance
N. Taylor (55) - Cannot Advance

Group 5
M. Homa (5) - (a) Win, (b) Draw, (c) Lose, then win sudden death against Matsuyama and possibly Suh if he wins
H. Matsuyama (18) - Win, then win sudden death against Homa and possibly Suh if he wins
K. Kisner (42) - Cannot Advance
J. Suh (63) - Win, have Matsuyama beat Homa, and then win 3 way sudden death against Homa and Matsuyama

Group 6
X. Schauffele (6) - (a) Win, (b) Draw, (c) Lose, and have Wise/Davis draw, (d) Lose, then win sudden death against winner of Wise/Davis
T. Hoge (23) - Cannot Advance
A. Wise (40) - Win, have Schauffele lose, then win sudden death against Schauffele
C. Davis (64) - Win, have Schauffele lose, then win sudden death against Schauffele

Group 7
W. Zalatoris (7) - Cannot Advance
R. Fox (29) - Win, have English beat Putnam, then win 3 way sudden death against English and Putnam
H. English (37) - Win, then win in sudden death against Putnam, and possibly Fox if he wins
A. Putnam (56) - (a) Win, (b) Draw, (c) Lose, then win sudden death against English and possible Fox if he wins

Group 8
V. Hovland (8) - Cannot Advance
C. Kirk (28) - Cannot Advance
S. Kim (34) - (a) Win, (b) Draw
M. Kuchar (59) - Win

Group 9
C. Morikawa (9) - (a) Win
J. Day (32) - (a) Win, (b) Draw
A. Svensson (44) - Cannot Advance
V. Perez (51) - Cannot Advance

Group 10
T. Finau (10) - (a) Win, (b) Draw, (c) Lose, then win sudden death against Kitayama and possibly Meronk if he wins
K. Kitayama (19) - Win, then win sudden death against Finau and possible Meronk if he wins
A. Meronk (45) - Win, have Kitayama win against Finau, and win 3 way sudden death agains Finau and Kitayama
C. Bexuidenhout (60) - Cannot Advance

Group 11
M. Fitzpatrick (11) - Win, have Lee beat Spaun, and win 3 way sudden death against Lee and Spaun
S. Theegala (26) - Cannot Advance
M. Lee (41) - Win, then win sudden death against Spaun and possibly Fitzpatrick if he wins
J. Spaun - (a) Win, (b) Draw, (c) Lose, then win sudden death against Lee and possibly Fitzpatrick if he wins

Group 12
J. Speith (12) - Win, have Hughes win against Montgomery, then win 3 way sudden death against Montgomery and Hughes
S. Lowry (21) - Cannot Advance
T. Montgomery (47) - (a) Win, (b) Draw, (c) Lose, then win sudden death against Hughes, and possibly Speith if he wins
M. Hughes (50) - Win, then win sudden death against Montgomery and possibly Speith if he wins

Group 13
S. Burns (13) - (a) Win, (b) Draw, (c) Lose, then win sudden death against Power, and possibly Scott if he wins
S. Power (30) - Win, then win sudden death against Burns and possibly Scott if he wins
A. Scott (33) - Win, have Power win against Burns, and then win 3 way sudden death against Burns and Power
A. Hadwin (53) - Cannot Advance

Group 14
T. Hatton (14) - Cannot Advance
R. Henley (31) - Win, have Griffin win against Herbert, then win 3 way sudden death against Herbert and Griffin
L. Herbert (46) - (a) Win, (b) Draw, (c) Lose, then win sudden death against Griffin and possibly Henley if he wins
B. Griffin (62) - Win, then win sudden death against Herbert and possibly Henley if he wins

Group 15
C. Young (15) - (a) Win, (b) Draw, (c) Lose, and have Conners/Thompson draw, (d) Lose, then win sudden death against winner of Connors/Thompson
S. Straka (27) - Cannot Advance
C. Connors (36) - Win, have Straka win against Young, then win sudden death against Young
D. Thompson (57) - Win, have Straka win against Young, then win sudden death against Young

Group 16
S. Im (16) - Win, have McNealy win against Poston, then win sudden death against Poston
T. Fleetwood (24) - Cannot Advance
J. Poston (43) - (a) Win, (b) Draw, (c) Lose, and have Fleetwood win against Im, (d) Lose, and have Im/Fleetwood draw, (e) Lose, have Im win against Fleetwood, then win sudden death against Im
submitted by Fridaysgame to golf [link] [comments]

2023.03.24 02:19 Due_Set7720 200+ Free Udemy Certificate Courses - PART 1- 24/3/23

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2023.03.24 02:06 Justdoingmybesttt 7 months post twin abortion- feel I don’t deserve to get pregnant again.

Edit: this is a particularly rough moment for me- I don’t mean to make anyone going through an abortion think this is a typical reaction- I have made a post here the complete opposite of this when I was in a different headspace saying how much relief I felt and how grateful I was to have the option, for me this comes in waves on occasion and is not something I think of every day at all! Just wanted to give that heads up x
Hello- I made the decision to have a MA at 7/8 weeks in September with twins. I still can’t type or say or hear the word twins without getting a lump in my throat. I am just seeking support and a place to share.
I have been with my husband for 16 years, since we were 20, I’m almost 37. We used the pullout method & tracking successfully for 13ish years until we had our son, and he took over a year to conceive. I had a very traumatic pregnancy & labor and he had long nicu time that was difficult.
18 months postpartum we began trying again, thinking it would take at least a year again. It took a month. I immediately had mental health issues, whether hormonal or instinct, I felt something terrible was happening, knew I was pregnant, was not happy like I was with my first. (I have bad panic disorder & major depression that is typically under control.)
I went to a very early private ultrasound and found it was twins- absolutely devastating because twins are magical, the societal view of such a lucky thing, so rare and special- I broke my husbands heart because although he knew financially and economically we couldn’t handle 2 more (we also have zero family support and adding one more we had to literally logistically plan) he is very optimistic and thought we could make it work. He ended up agreeing and supporting me and we cried together that night and the next day I took the pills and went through it all basically alone. I have been through a lot in my life but I don’t think I’ll ever get over this.
My biggest issue is I feel I don’t deserve another baby now. I’m scared I will be punished for what I’ve done. That something horrible will happen with me or my next baby now if I do try. I’m almost 40 now and feel my time is almost up but I’m too traumatized to try again.
Ultimately I KNOW I made the right decision for our family but the loneliness and hurt is so great at times. I feel so devastated and just can’t seem to find a way to find peace.
submitted by Justdoingmybesttt to abortion [link] [comments]

2023.03.24 02:04 WingChungGuruKhabib The Future of Privacy in Crypto: Examples/Use Cases for ZK-Proofs and TEEs.

This post is meant to help people understand the endless new possibilities that ZK-proofs and TEEs will bring to the crypto space.
Created a post similar to this a few days ago and another one a few days before that one. Added some extra ideas this time in the hope that it gains a bit more traction which in turn would hopefully lead to more examples/ideas of how to implement this tech.
Wanted to provide a number of examples that show what ZK-proofs (zero-knowledge proofs) and especially TEEs (trusted execution environments) can mean for the crypto space. I feel like examples are important and left out too much when talking about new tech. Some examples may be similar, would be nice if people could come up with more examples in the comments.
  1. Undercollateralized or variable rate lending. Borrower reputation can be established via private data such as credit history. Those with a good reputation can get loans using less collateral and/or loans with lower interest rates.
  2. MEV-resistant DEXs. Important aspects of orders such as slippage parameters can be kept private from even the nodes themselves, preventing them from manipulating orders and/or frontrunning. This allows users to keep more of the value of their trades.
  3. Privacy-preserving decentralized identity. Also called anonymous credentials. This could allow people to, for example, satisfy KYC/AML laws without revealing their entire identity to everyone. This can also allow dApps to screen users based on e.g. age or country.
  4. Confidential NFTs. The owner of an NFT gains access to private data such as an image. This could be used to enhance the value of owning an NFT since not every aspect of the token is available publicly.
  5. Confidential voting. This could be especially useful for DAOs. It allows for votes to be held in which voters are not influenced by the votes that were submitted before them.
  6. Collaborative analytics. For example, multiple companies or individuals could pool their data and perform a privacy-preserving analysis whose results are only shared within a certain audience. Since data is only analyzed within a TEE, there is less chance for a data leak.
  7. Games with hidden on-chain state. Example: puzzle games in which there is an answer that must be kept from the player. Another example: Games in which players act on information that cannot be revealed to other players.
  8. Games that rely on random number generation. Through the use of TEEs to generate random numbers without an external oracle. Gambling games could make use of this (rolling a die). RPGs could incorporate this as well.
  9. An info leak marketplace. Leakers can upload private information. The leaker can choose to sell it to one, several, or many people. They can also set a fundraising threshold past which they will reveal the secret to everyone. Leaker's reputation can be based on ratings.
  10. *Proof-of-humanity. *A privacy-preserving user verification system can be implemented that proves a user is human based on uploaded ID documents or attestations from trusted institutions/companies. This could be useful on any dApp that wants to exclude bots.
  11. Decentralized and confidential job marketplaces. Job seekers and employers can use a platform that maintains privacy for both parties during the hiring process. Job seekers can prove their qualifications and experience without revealing their full identity or detailed resume, while employers can post job requirements without exposing sensitive company information. This can help prevent biases and maintain confidentiality during the hiring process.
  12. Decentralized, confidential insurance. A decentralized insurance platform can be built using TEEs to maintain the privacy of policyholders' personal information and claim history, while still allowing insurers to assess risk and calculate premiums. This can increase trust and transparency in the insurance market, while protecting individuals' sensitive data.
  13. Private, decentralized credit scoring. Credit scoring systems can be built using ZK-proofs and TEEs, allowing users to prove their creditworthiness without revealing detailed financial history. This can help reduce discrimination and enable more equitable access to financial services.
  14. *More fair auctions. *VCG, second price, and candle auctions are examples of more fair auction methods that require privacy.
  15. Prediction markets for crowdsourced data. Imagine sending out a survey to people asking a list of questions. After everyone submits the survey, they can bet on the results of this survey. E.g. "What is the most popular response to X? How do you predict X to relate to Y?"
  16. Biomedical data marketplace. Biometric data from wearing a smartwatch, demographic data, genomic data, blood work data, etc. all could be uploaded and protected so that only owners of the data can control who accesses it. Data analysts could pay data owners for access.
  17. Family Tree DAO. A type of Data DAO that stores family information like genome sequences, photos/videos and medical records. Data can be kept private within the family and passed down through the generations.
  18. Initial Data Offering (IDO). Any endeavor with the potential to yield valuable data could sell rights to future data revenue in order to raise funds. Studies, polls, surveys, Data DAOs, new data-generating products or applications, etc. could all raise money this way.
  19. Data science competitions for private data. This would be a decentralized version of Kaggle, which allows people to offer datasets that competitors can analyze in order to win reward money. For private data, all analyses would be performed within a TEE, preserving privacy.
Hopefully, this has been helpful to some people in understanding why private smart contracts are the most important thing to get right in the next few years. Important to note is that most of the ideas presented can only be implemented with TEEs.
My last 2 posts got some reactions, sadly no one shared some new ideas that i could add to this lost. Would be nice if someone could provide an idea this time :)
submitted by WingChungGuruKhabib to CryptoCurrency [link] [comments]

2023.03.24 01:46 Altruistic-Cod4123 You are blue holding the cube at 2. What's your move here?

You are blue holding the cube at 2. What's your move here? submitted by Altruistic-Cod4123 to backgammon [link] [comments]

2023.03.24 01:42 Stormlegend6330 Glamerock Freddy!

Glamerock Freddy!
I made Glamerock freddy in using!
submitted by Stormlegend6330 to TheFortniteCreatives [link] [comments]

2023.03.24 01:40 no_no777 Help with Progressed Moon square Natal Moon?

Help with Progressed Moon square Natal Moon? submitted by no_no777 to AskAstrologers [link] [comments]